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Abstract
By building a growth model with two classes, workers and capitalists, this study in-
vestigates the existence and the stability of the long-run equilibrium along the lines of
Pasinetti (1962) and Samuelson and Modigliani (1966). Unlike preceding studies in
which the propensity to save of each class is exogenously given, this study assumes that
workers solve a two-period overlapping generations model while capitalists solve an
infinite-horizon dynamic optimization model. Depending on the combinations of both
classes’ time preference rate, the parameter of the production function, and the popula-
tion growth rate, we obtain two kinds of long-run equilibria, the Pasinetti equilibrium
and dual equilibrium a` la Samuelson-Modigliani. We show that under realistic values
of the parameters, the economy is likely to converge to the Pasinetti equilibrium.
Keywords: workers and capitalists; intertemporal optimization; Pasinetti equilibrium;
dual equilibrium
JEL Classification: E13; E21; E25
1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to theoretically investigate the existence, stability, and prop-
erty of the steady-state equilibrium of the economy in which workers and capitalist coexist.
Unlike previous studies that assume the constant propensities to save of both classes, we as-
sume that both workers and capitalists solve dynamic optimization problems. This leads to
revealing to the fundamental nature of the capitalist economy and contributes to the debate
of income distribution policy in the long run.
Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University. E-mail: sasaki@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp
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There exists much literature that investigates the property of the long-run equilibrium in
a growing economy in which workers and capitalists coexist.
Pasinetti (1962) is a pioneering study and presents the “Pasinetti theorem” such that the
long-run profit rate is given by the natural growth rate divided by capitalists’ propensity to
save as long as the capitalists’ propensity to save exceeds the workers’ propensity to save.
This theorem shows that the long-run profit rate is independent of the workers’ propensity
to save.
On the contrary, Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) point out that the derivation of the
Pasinetti theorem hinges on the implicit assumption that the capitalists’ propensity to save is
considerably larger than the workers’ propensity to save. In addition, they show that unless
the implicit assumption is satisfied, the long-run profit rate is given by the natural growth
rate times the output elasticity of capital divided by the workers’ propensity to save. This is
called the “dual theorem”.
After these two studies, many researches are produced that modify the specifications and
assumptions of models and examine whether the Pasinetti theorem and the dual theorem are
theoretically and empirically valid.
However, almost all previous studies assume that both the workers’ propensity to save
and capitalists’ propensity to save are constant through time: both classes are agents that do
not make future consumption plans.
In contrast, this study assumes that workers and capitalists are rational agents that make
future consumption plans given the life-time budget constraints. Specifically, workers solve
a two-period over-lapping generations problem while capitalists solve a infinite-horizon
Ramsey problem.1
Such an attempt is also done by Michl and Foley (2004). They build a growth model
in which workers solve a two-period overlapping generations model and capitalists solve
an infinite-horizon dynamic optimization model. They use a fixed coecient Leontief pro-
duction function and let the real wage rate exogenously given according to the Classical
assumption. However, in reality, substitution between labor and capital are observed in the
long run. Moreover, many developed countries experience near-full employment in the long
run, and hence, the real wage rate is adjusted to equate labor demand and labor supply.
For this reason, thus study uses a neoclassical production function with labor-capital
substitution and assumes that the real wage rate is endogenously determined by the full
employment condition. Using the model, we investigate (1) whether the long-run equilib-
1The importance that macroeconomists should consider agents with dierent saving propensities is empha-
sized by Mankiw (2000). He presents a model in which there exist “spenders” that do not save and “savers”
that save, and shows that the eects of fiscal policy and government debt on the economy are dierent from
the results of over-lapping generations models and Ramsey models.
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rium exists, (2) how many equilibria exist if they exist, (3) whether the long-run equilibrium
is stable, (4) to which equilibrium the economy converges, and (5) how fast the speed of
convergence is.
The contribution of this study is as follows.
Many existing studies including Pasinetti (1962) use two state variables, workers’ own
capital stock and capitalists’ own capital stock. Accordingly, those systems are a system of
two-dimensional first-order dierential equation or a system of two-dimensional first-order
dierence equation. Therefore, it is dicult to examine the speed of convergence toward
the long-run equilibrium from initial values. In contrast, from our model, we can derive
a one-dimensional second-order dierence equation as well as a system two-dimensional
first-order dierence equation. For this reason, we can relatively easily compute the speed
of convergence, and carry out numerical simulations.
Unlike the existing models that assume exogenously given propensities to save, the
model of this study considers each class’s utility maximization. Accordingly, by using
meaningful parameters that specify the shape of the utility function, and not by arbitrary
parameters—saving rate, we can obtain conditions under which the Pasinetti equilibrium
and the dual equilibrium occur. For example, if the government conducts a policy of income
redistribution, workers and capitalists are expected to change their saving rates in response
to the policy. However, models of constant saving rates cannot consider this change in the
saving rates. On the other hand, since our model considers agents’ optimization behavior,
the saving rate changes in response to economic policy. Therefore, we can strictly cap-
ture the eect of economic policy. This property of the model are useful when conducting
numerical simulations.
For related studies, we can refer to the following studies.
Kaldor (1956) presents an economic growth model in which the saving rate of workers
and that of capitalists are dierent. However, as Pasinetti (1962) points out, Kaldor’s model
is a model in which the propensity to save from wage and the propensity to save from profit
are dierent.2
Pasinetti (1962) argues that if workers save, then workers obtain interest income by hold-
ing capital stock through saving. Accordingly, the total capital stock of the whole economy
is composed of workers’ own capital stock and capitalists’ own capital stock. In addition,
he reveals that at the long-run equilibrium where workers and capitalists coexist, the profit
rate is given by the natural growth rate divided by capitalists’ saving rate, which is called
2Bo¨hm and Kaas (2000) build a discrete time growth model with a Kaldorian saving function and show the
occurrence of chaotic dynamics when the production function takes the Leontief form. Dalgaard and Hansen
(2005) extend a Solow growth model with two dierent saving rates and show that multiple equilibria occur if
the propensity to save from wage is higher than the propensity to save from profit.
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the Pasinetti theorem.
In contrast, Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) reveal that the derivation of the Pasinetti
theorem critically hinges on the assumption that the capitalists’ propensity to save is much
higher than the workers’ propensity to save. Then, they show that unless the assumption is
satisfied, the dual equilibrium is obtained.
With regard to the debate between Pasinetti (1962) and Samuelson andModigliani (1966),
Furuno (1970) examines the speed of convergence toward the Pasinetti equilibrium and the
dual equilibrium by building a neoclassical growth model with the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function.
Faria and Teixeira (1999) introduce a government sector into a two-class neo-classical
growth model with the Cobb-Douglas production function. They show that for the steady-
state equilibrium to be stable, the output elasticity of capital in the production function must
be close to unity. In this case, the ratio of capitalists’ own capita stock to the total capital
stock approaches unity, which is called the “anti-dual” equilibrium.3
Zamparelli (2017) also investigates the anti-dual equilibrium. He focuses on the case
where the production function takes the constant-elasticity-substitution form, the elasticity
of substitution exceeds unity, and endogenous growth occurs. In this case, the economy
converges to the anti-dual equilibrium, capitalists’ own capital stock share approaches unity,
and the profit share approaches unity.
Closest to our study is Commendatore and Palmisani (2009). They extend a model of
Michl and Foley (2004) and present a model in which the real wage rate is endogenously
determined by the full employment condition.4 In contrast to our study, they use a CES
production function and investigate a case in which the elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital is less than unity. In this case, chaotic dynamics occur depending on
conditions. On the other hand, the present study uses a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Interests of analysis are dierent from the present study. They focuses on the analysis of
chaotic dynamics while we focus on the property of the steady-state equilibrium, the speed
of convergence, and the dynamics of income distribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model.
3For the anti-dual equilibrium, see Darity (1981). He shows that using a eective demand constrained
Keynesian model, there occurs the anti-dual equilibrium in addition to the Pasinetti equilibrium and the dual
equilibrium. For studies that consider two dierent saving rates in demand-constrained Keynesian model,
see Torii (2012) and Kumar, Schoder, and Radpour (2018). Van der Ploeg (1984) extends a Goodwin model
to consider workers’ saving and shows that the dual equilibrium is stable while the Pasinetti equilibrium is
unstable.
4For a two-class growth model with dynamic optimization, see Faria and Araujo (2004). They present
a continuous-time model in which both workers and capitalists solve the Ramsey model. However, they
assume that both classes time preference rates are equal, and focus only on the steady state, not the transitional
dynamics.
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Section 3 obtains the long-run equilibria, that is, the Pasinetti equilibrium and the dual equi-
librium, and investigates the stability of each long-run equilibrium. Section 4 investigates
to which equilibrium the economy converges by using parameter values obtained from eco-
nomic data. Section 5 discusses the dynamic eciency of the Pasinetti equilibrium and the
dual equilibrium. Section analyzes the income distribution between workers and capitalists.
Section 7 investigates the speed of convergence toward each long-run equilibrium. Section
8 concludes.
2 Model
Suppose an economy in which workers and capitalists coexist. Capitalists lend their own
capital to firms, obtain interest income, and allocate interest income between consumption
and saving. Capitalists behave as a dynasty that continues infinitely. Therefore, capitalists
solve the infinite horizon dynamic optimization problem. In contrast, workers at the young
period supply inelastically one unit of labor to firms and allocate the wage income between
consumption and saving. At the old period, workers use their own saving to consume.
Workers do not have bequest motive. Therefore, workers’ optimization problem is described
as an over-lapping generations model.
2.1 Capitalists’ problem
Capitalists solve the following infinite horizon dynamic optimization problem:
max (1   c)
1X
t=0
tc logC
c
t ; 0 < c < 1;
s.t. Cct + K
c
t+1  (1 + rt)Kct ;
Kc0; rt : given;
where c denotes the discount factor of capitalist; Cc, consumption of capitalists; Kc, capi-
talists’ own capital stock; and r, the profit rate.
From the first-order necessary conditions, we obtain the Euler equation of consumption
as follows:
Cct+1 = c(1 + rt+1)C
c
t : (1)
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From this, we obtain the following consumption function:
Cct = (1   c)(1 + rt)Kct : (2)
The equation for capitalists’ capital accumulation is given by
Kct+1 = c(1 + rt)K
c
t : (3)
This equation shows that the capitalists’ propensity to save from stock wealth is given by c.
Let sc denote the capitalists’ propensity to save from flow profit. Then, sc is given by
sc =
rKc  Cc
rKc
= 1   (1   c) 1 + rr : (4)
Along the transitional dynamics toward the steady-state equilibrium, r changes, and hence,
the capitalists’ propensity to save also changes. However, when r is constant at the steady-
state equilibrium, the capitalists’ propensity to save is also constant.
2.2 Workers’ problem
Suppose that the number of workers is Lt, workers are fully employed, and Lt grows at a
constant rate n. Workers solve the following two-period optimization problem.
max (1   w) log cw1;t + w log cw2;t+1; 0 < w < 1;
s.t. cw1;t +
cw2;t+1
1 + rt+1
 wt;
wt; rt+1 : given;
where w denotes the discount factor of workers; cw1 , workers’ consumption at the young
period; cw2 , workers’ consumption at the old period; and w, the real wage rate.
From this, we obtain the following consumption and saving functions.
cw1;t = (1   w)wt; (5)
swt = wwt; (6)
where s denotes the workers’ saving. Equation (6) shows that the workers’ propensity to
save is given by w.
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The equation for workers’ capital accumulation is given by
Kwt+1 = s
w
t Lt = wwtLt: (7)
2.3 Firms
Firms produce a good available for consumption and investment by using labor and capital
inputs. Suppose that the production function is a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb Douglas
production function, which is given by Yt = Kt L
1 
t , 0 <  < 1. From profit maximization,
the real wage rate and the rate of profit are respectively given by as follows.
wt = w(kt) = (1   )kt ; (8)
rt = r(kt) = k 1t ; (9)
where k = K=L denotes the capital stock per labor. We assume that capital stock does not
depreciate.
3 Two-variable system
We investigate the dynamics of capital stock. Let kc = Kc=L and kw = Kw=L be the capital-
ists’ own capital stock divided by labor and the workers’ own capital stock divided by labor,
respectively. Here, since K = Kc +Kw, we have k = kc + kw. From equations (3) and (7), the
dynamical equations of kct and k
w
t are respectively given by
kct+1 =
c
1 + n
[1 + r(kt)]kct ; (10)
kwt+1 =
w
1 + n
w(kt); (11)
r(kt) = f 0(kt); (12)
w(kt) = f (kt)   kt f 0(kt); (13)
kt = kct + k
w
t : (14)
The steady-state equilibrium is a situation where kct = k
c
t+1 = k
c, kwt = k
w
t+1 = k
w. From
equations (10) and (11), the steady-state values of kc and kw satisfy the following equations.
kc =
c
1 + n
[1 + r(k)]kc; (15)
kw =
w
1 + n
w(k): (16)
7
We investigate two cases: kc > 0 (interior solutions) and kc = 0 (corner solutions). Clearly,
kc = 0 satisfies equation (15). Substituting k = kw = 0 into equation (16), we obtain
w(0) = f (0) = 0. Therefore, we obtain trivial solutions k = kc = kw = 0.
3.1 Pasinetti equilibrium
When kc , 0, by dividing equation (15) by kc, we obtain the steady-state equilibrium value
of k. Then, the profit rate does not at all depend on the shape of the production function and
the marginal productivity of capital. Substituting k into equation (16), we obtain kw. From
kc = k   kw, we obtain kc. This equilibrium is called the Pasinetti equilibrium since Pasinetti
(1962) considers this case. When the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the
Pasinetti equilibrium is given by
kP =
 
1 + n   c
c
! 1
 1
; (17)
kwP =
w(1   )
1 + n
 
1 + n   c
c
! 1
 1
; (18)
kcP = kP   kwP ; (19)
rP =
1 + n   c
c
; (20)
sc =
nc
1 + n   c : (21)
3.2 Dual equilibrium
When kc = 0, we have k = kw. From equation (16), we obtain kw and k. At this steady-
state equilibrium, capitalists do not own capital stock. This equilibrium is called the “dual
equilibrium” since Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) point out to criticize Pasinetti (1962).
When the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the dual equilibrium is given
by
kD = kwD =
"
1 + n
w(1   )
# 1
 1
; (22)
kcD = 0; (23)
rD =

1    
1 + n
w
: (24)
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4 Stability of long-run equilibrium
We investigate the stability of the Pasinetti equilibrium and the dual equilibrium by using
phase diagrams.
From kct+1 = k
c
t , we obtain
kct =  kwt +
 
c
1 + n   c
! 1
1 
=  kwt + A: (25)
This is a straight line with the slope being  1 and the intercept being A > 0.
From kwt+1 = k
w
t , we obtain
kct =  kwt +
"
1 + n
(1   )w  k
w
t
# 1

: (26)
Dierentiating both sides with respect to kwt , we have
@kct
@kwt
=  1 + 1

"
1 + n
(1   )w
# 1

(kwt )
1 
 : (27)
When kwt = 0, the sigh of the derivative is  1. As kwt becomes larger, the sign of the derivative
will become positive.
Moreover, substituting kct = 0 into equation (26), we obtain
kwt =
"
(1   )w
1 + n
# 1
1 
= B: (28)
According to the sizes of A and B, we obtain two-kinds of phase diagrams. The condition
that A > B is given by
w <
c(1 + n)
(1   )(1 + n   c) : (29)
When A > B, we obtain a phase diagram given by Figure 1. In this case, we obtain two
equilibria. Point P denotes the Pasinetti equilibrium and Point D denotes the dual equilib-
rium. From Figure 1, we know that the Pasinetti equilibrium is globally stable while the
dual equilibrium is globally unstable.
When A < B, we obtain a phase diagram given by Figure 4. In this case, we obtain an
equilibrium. From Figure 4, we know that the dual equilibrium is globally stable.
From the above analysis, we obtain the following two propositions.
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Figure 1: Convergence to Pasinetti equilibrium
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Figure 2: Convergence to dual equilibrium
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Proposition 1. Suppose that w < c(1 + n)=[(1   )(1 + n   c)]. Then, there exist the
Pasinetti equilibrium and the dual equilibrium. The Pasinetti equilibrium is globally stable
while the dual equilibrium is globally unstable.
Proposition 2. Suppose that w > c(1 + n)=[(1   )(1 + n   c)]. Then, there exists the
dual equilibrium. The dual equilibrium is globally stable.
From the above two propositions, we know that the economy converges to the Pasinetti
equilibrium when w < c(1 + n)=[(1   )(1 + n   c)] while it converges to the dual
equilibrium when w > c(1 + n)=[(1   )(1 + n   c)].
Theoretically, it is possible that the economy converges to each equilibrium. Then, we
investigate whether the economy is likely to converge to the Pasinetti equilibrium or the dual
equilibrium by giving numerical values to the parameters.
First, by considering the average capital share in developed countries, we set the capital
share as  = 0:3.
Second, according to de la Croix and Michel (2002), we use w = 0:23. Since they
use the utility function such that u = log cw1;t + c
w
2;t+1 and the value of  = 0:3, we use
w = =(1 + ) = 0:23 in our model. The reason why they use  = 0:3 is that they set the
quarter discount rate as 0.99 and assume that the one period in the OLG model is 30 years:
 = 0:99430  0:3.
Third, we use n = (1 + 0:01)30   1 = 0:35 because we assume that annual population
growth rate is 1%.
Fourth, according to Storm and Naastepad (2012), the average propensity to save from
profit income in developed countries is 0.5. From the capitalists’ propensity to save at the
Pasinetti equilibrium sc = nc=(1 + n   c), we obtain c = 0:66.
From the above parameter values, we compute c(1 + n)=[(1   )(1 + n   c)] = 0:55,
wich is larger than w = 0:23. Then, the economy converges to the Pasinetti equilibrium.
Therefore, the economy in reality is likely to converge to the Pasinetti equilibrium.
5 Dynamic eciency
We investigate whether the Pasinetti equilibrium and/or dual equilibrium is excessive sav-
ing, that is, whether the equilibrium satisfies the dynamic eciency. At the steady-state
equilibrium, the capital stock per labor that maximizes consumption per labor is given by
kGR =


n
 1
1 
: (30)
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We compare this value with kP and kD.
At the Pasinetti equilibrium, we obtain
sgn(kP   kGR) =  (1 + n)(1   c)n(1 + n   c) < 0; (31)
which suggests that kP < kGR. Therefore, at the Pasinetti equilibrium, the dynamic ine-
ciency does not occur.
At the dual equilibrium, we obtain
sgn(kD   kGR) = wn(1   )   (1 + n)n(1 + n) : (32)
This sign will be positive provided that
w >

1    
1 + n
n
: (33)
This condition can be satisfied if  is small and n is large. Then, we obtain kD > kGR, and
therefore, the dynamic ineciency will occur.
Proposition 3. The Pasinetti equilibrium satisfies the dynamic eciency while the dual equi-
librium can be dynamically inecient.
At the steady-state equilibrium of the typical Ramsey model, the modified golden rule is
attained, and hence, excessive accumulation of capital does not occur. At the Pasinetti equi-
librium of our model too, excessive accumulation of capital does not occur. In contrast, at
the dual equilibrium, excessive accumulation of capital will occur depending on conditions,
which is the same as the steady-state equilibrium of the typical OLG model such that only
workers exist.
The relationship between the profit rate and the economic growth rate is as follows. We
have r = n at the golden equilibrium, r > n at the Pasinetti equilibrium, and r R n at the dual
equilibrium.
6 Income distribution between workers and capitalists
We examine income distribution between workers and capitalists. Using the Cobb-Douglas
production function, the labor share and the capital share are 1    and , respectively. In
our model, however, workers obtain profit income, and hence, workers’ income share and
capitalists’ income share are dierent from  and 1   , respectively.
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Let w and c denote the workers’ income share and capitalists’ income share, respec-
tively. Then, we obtain
w =
wL + rKw
Y
= (1   ) +  k
w
kw + kc
; (34)
c =
rKc
Y
= 1   w =  k
c
kw + kc
: (35)
At the Pasinetti equilibrium, each class’s income share is given by
w =
(1   )(1 + n + w)
1 + n
; (36)
c =
[1 + n   w(1   )]
1 + n
: (37)
Interestingly, these income shares do not depend on the capitalists’ discount factor c. Each
class’s income share depends on the workers’ discount factor, the population growth rate,
and the parameter of the production function.
At the dual equilibrium, each class’s income share is given by
w = 1; (38)
c = 0: (39)
Moreover, along the transitional dynamics toward the steady-state equilibrium, each
class’s income share continues to change. Rewriting the workers’ income share as
w = (1   ) + 
1 + k
c
t
kwt
; (40)
we see that w decreases when kct =k
w
t increases while w increases when k
c
t =k
w
t decreases.
7 Speed of convergence to long-run equilibrium
We note that our model is also described as the second-order dierence equation of one
state variable K. Since the total capital stock of the economy is the sum of the capitalists’
own capital stock and the workers’ own capital stock, the capital stock at t + 1 is given by
Kt+1 = Kct+1 + K
w
t+1. The workers’ own capital capita stock at t + 1 is given by K
w
t+1 = s
w
t Lt,
and hence, we obtain the following equation.
Kt+1 = c(1 + rt)Kct + wwtLt: (41)
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Substituting Kct = Kt   Kwt into the above equation, we obtain
Kt+1 = c(1 + rt)(Kt   wwt 1Lt 1) + wwtLt: (42)
Dividing both sides with respect to Lt+1, we have
kt+1 =
w
1 + n
wt +
c
1 + n
(1 + rt)kt   wc(1 + rt)wt 1(1 + n)2 : (43)
Substituting rt = r(kt), wt = w(kt), and wt 1 = w(kt 1) into the above equation, we obtain the
second-order non-linear dierence equation of k.
When the production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form, the dynamical equation for
capital accumulation is given by
kt+2 =
w
1 + n
(1   )kt+1 +
c
1 + n
(kt+1 + kt+1)  
wc
(1 + n)2
(1   )(1 + k 1t+1 )kt : (44)
Using this dierence equation, we examine the speed of convergence toward the steady-state
equilibrium.
As mentioned above, Furuno (1970) computes the speed of convergence toward the
Pasinetti equilibrium and the dual equilibrium. He reveals that it takes very long time for
the economy converge to each equilibrium. For example, 90% convergence toward the dual
equilibrium takes 500 years.5
Figure 3: Convergence speed to Pasinetti equilibrium
5Using the neoclassical growth theory, Sato (1963) computes the speed of convergence and shows that 90%
convergence takes about 100 years. King and Rebelo (1993), using the Ramsey model, compute the speed of
convergence and shows that 90% convergence takes 40 years when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of consumption is equal to 2.
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Under our parameter setting, it takes about 40 periods to converge toward the Pasinetti
equilibrium, which is shown in Figure 3. If the one period is 30 years, then the convergence
toward the Pasinetti equilibrium takes 1200 years.6
8 Concluding remarks
This study builds a model in which both workers and capitalists conduct dynamic optimiza-
tion and investigates the property and the stability of the long-run equilibrium. The intro-
duction of dynamic optimizing behavior is largely dierent form previous studies including
Pasinetti (1962) and Samuelson and Modigliani (1966).
Our results show that the economy can converge to the Pasinetti equilibrium or the dual
equilibrium depending on the sizes of the parameters. The results also show that the econ-
omy is likely to converge to the Pasinetti equilibrium under realistic values of the parame-
ters. Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) and Furuno (1970) show that whether the economy
converges to the Pasinetti equilibrium or the dual equilibrium depends on the three vari-
ables: workers’ propensity to save, capitalists’ propensity to save, and capital share. In
contrast, in our model, whether the economy converges to the Pasinetti equilibrium or the
dual equilibrium depends on the four variables: workers’ time preference rate, capitalists’
time preference rate, capital share, and the population growth rate.
For income distribution, we can say that at the Pasinetti equilibrium, workers’ and cap-
italists’ income shares do not depend on capitalists’ time preference rate. This result is
contrasted to the result that the profit rate at the Pasinetti equilibrium does not depend on
workers’ time preference rate.
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